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Horrificdetective / Wikimedia Commons · CC0 1.0 ↗ July 1921 · the National Struggle at a critical threshold
Kütahya–Eskişehir: defeat, withdrawal and rebuilding
July 1921 was not an uninterrupted march from one victory to another. Ankara’s army lost important centres and withdrew east of the Sakarya to preserve its forces. This dossier acknowledges defeat while distinguishing an operation’s result from the outcome of the war, explaining how the defence at Sakarya became possible.
10–24 July 1921 · redeployment on 25 JulyAfyonkarahisar · Kütahya · Eskişehir · east of the Sakarya
Kütahya railway station, 28 July 2023. A present-day location photograph introducing the railway context; its building and surroundings are not presented as their 1921 appearance or as a combat scene.
At a glance
- Main campaign range
- 10–24 July 1921
- Eskişehir counterattack
- 21 July
- Withdrawal east of the Sakarya
- 25 July
- Commander-in-Chief Law
- 5 August · No.144
Why the war changed again after İnönü
The First and Second Battles of İnönü demonstrated the regular army’s capacity to defend its positions, but they did not drive Greek forces out of Anatolia. The spring fighting at Aslıhanlar and Dumlupınar also exposed different problems in the southern sector. Bringing the Southern Front’s formations under Western Front command in May was an organisational response, not an instant solution to shortages of weapons, training or supplies. Greek command increased its forces and sought a decisive defeat of Ankara’s army. July should therefore not be read as March’s battle repeated under identical conditions. The new offensive involved a broader geography and different concentrations of strength. An army that had won at İnönü could lose here without making either outcome unreal. Military results emerged from changing resources and decisions. The memory of an earlier victory could not replace a realistic assessment of the next campaign’s balance of forces. This is why the July chapter belongs between İnönü and Sakarya rather than outside a triumphal chronology.
↑ Back to dossier contentsThree cities and a connected problem of transport
Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya and Eskişehir were more than names placed consecutively on a map. Rail connections, road junctions and surrounding heights affected the movement of formations and the transport of their requirements. Pressure from the north and south meant that holding one position did not guarantee the security of adjacent sectors. The danger of encirclement could matter as much as the attack directly ahead. Commanders had to assess a local success within the wider deployment of units. Modern driving times offer a misleading guide to this landscape: exhausted infantry, guns and transport animals crossed the same distance at different speeds. Communications, maintenance and food supply all constrained movement. The photograph of Kütahya station on this page was taken in 2023. It introduces the railway geography from the present, without claiming that its building or surroundings show their appearance in 1921. Distinguishing a historical transport network from later architecture allows a place to illuminate the past without being misrepresented as a contemporary document of battle.
↑ Back to dossier contentsThe July offensive and a loss at Yumruçal
The sources use different boundaries for the operation. The Ministry of National Defence and the Atatürk Encyclopaedia use 10–24 July for the main campaign; the Turkish Historical Society’s account emphasises the advance beginning on 8 July and a heading of 8–21 July. This dossier distinguishes the general attack, concentrated fighting and final redeployment. Pressure around Kütahya and Nasuhçal strained Turkish positions and their connections to neighbouring formations. Mehmet Nâzım Bey, commander of the Fourth Division, died at Yumruçal on 15 July and was promoted to colonel after his death. His loss gives a human dimension to movements that can otherwise seem to consist only of arrows. Losing Afyonkarahisar, Kütahya and Eskişehir reduced military and administrative possibilities. Yet the number of cities lost does not establish that the entire army was destroyed. Equally, the subsequent victory at Sakarya did not retroactively turn July’s defeat into a victory. Each result needs to be assessed within the circumstances in which it occurred.
↑ Back to dossier contents18 July: relinquishing ground to preserve the army
Mustafa Kemal Pasha assessed the situation at Western Front headquarters on 18 July. He advised İsmet Pasha that increasing the distance from the Greek army, including withdrawal east of the Sakarya, would allow Turkish formations to be strengthened and reorganised. This decision should not be judged only through knowledge of the later victory. The immediate problem was keeping the army intact as an organised force capable of mounting another defence. The loss of a city or position was a serious defeat, but encirclement of the formations could produce an even more damaging result. Withdrawal required orderly separation from the opponent, usable routes, movement of guns and equipment, rear-guard security and arrival at new assembly areas. It is important not to attribute the commander-in-chief powers conferred on 5 August to Mustafa Kemal’s July role. He was then providing political and military direction as President of the Assembly, while İsmet Pasha commanded the Western Front. Distinguishing institutional responsibilities gives each contribution its proper setting.
↑ Back to dossier contents21 July: a counterattack before the final withdrawal
The assessment made on 18 July did not mean that the following days were an uncontested march. Turkish forces moved to the line east of Eskişehir and around Seyitgazi. Hoping to exploit a gap in the Greek deployment, they counterattacked towards Eskişehir on 21 July. Early progress did not produce a lasting result. Greek troops recovered, and threats to the flanks and rear led Turkish command to withdraw again. The episode shows that operational choices could change during battle: an attempted counterattack and a larger strategic withdrawal can be separate decisions within the same campaign. Western Front headquarters moved to Polatlı on 24 July. The movement of formations east of the Sakarya is recorded as reaching its final stage on 25 July. Accordingly, the title’s range of 10–24 July does not erase the event on the following day. Movement and redeployment were human and logistical processes that extended beyond a campaign’s conventional date heading. Recognising that distinction also explains why reliable chronologies can list different endpoints without necessarily describing incompatible events.
↑ Back to dossier contentsBehind the front: transport, casualties and civilian lives
An army in retreat needed more than a new line on a map. Moving wounded personnel, feeding formations, delivering ammunition and regrouping dispersed soldiers had to be undertaken together. The Ministry of National Defence’s account of air operations discusses reconnaissance alongside the limited technical resources available. Information only assisted a headquarters if observed movements were communicated in time; modern expectations of continuous surveillance should not be projected onto 1921. The loss of cities also affected civilian administration, livelihoods and people’s sense of security. A formation’s movement and the date on which a particular family left home cannot be established from the same document. Occupation, damage and displacement in the region deserve examination through local records and testimony. Destruction documented during the Greek withdrawal in 1922, in particular, should not automatically be assigned to July 1921. No unsupported aggregate casualty figure or invented family story is supplied here. Civilian uncertainty remains a distinct historical subject connected to military outcomes, rather than a decorative anecdote attached to commanders’ decisions. Reconstructing a household’s experience requires its own evidence.
↑ Back to dossier contentsParliament’s crisis, an education congress and August preparation
Defeat sharpened political argument in Ankara. How to rebuild the army and how Parliament would continue its responsibilities were connected questions. Fevzi Pasha’s explanations to the Assembly demonstrate that the crisis was not managed solely from a field headquarters. During the same July period, the Maarif Congress discussed education programmes. Considering schooling while the war continued reveals that a future not yet secured was nevertheless part of the political objective. It should not imply that every educational problem was solved at the congress. On 5 August, Law No.144 gave Mustafa Kemal the commander-in-chief role for three months and authorised him to exercise specified parliamentary powers on the Assembly’s behalf. The National Obligations orders of 7–8 August organised the mobilisation of social resources to meet the army’s requirements. These were distinct decisions taken after July’s defeat. The route to Sakarya, which began on 23 August, involved reconnecting parliamentary authority, military command, soldiers and civilian resources. It cannot adequately be explained by one leader’s determination alone, nor by treating the army’s recovery as an inevitable outcome already known in July.
↑ Back to dossier contentsRead the turning points together
- 3 May 1921
Western Front consolidation
Southern formations were brought under Western Front command. Reorganisation did not make material and training problems disappear on the same day.
- 8–10 July 1921
Advance and general offensive
The movement of 8 July and general offensive of 10 July are distinct stages. The Ministry’s main range is 10–24 July; the Historical Society uses a narrower 8–21 July heading.
- 15 July 1921
The loss of Mehmet Nâzım Bey
The Fourth Division commander died at Yumruçal. His promotion to colonel on the following day was posthumous.
- 18 July 1921
Assessing withdrawal and rebuilding
At Western Front headquarters, Mustafa Kemal advised İsmet Pasha that separation as far as east of the Sakarya would allow formations to be reorganised.
- 21 July 1921
A counterattack towards Eskişehir
Early progress did not secure a lasting result. Threats to the flanks and rear necessitated a renewed decision to withdraw.
- 24–25 July 1921
Polatlı and the east bank
Headquarters moved to Polatlı on 24 July; the formations’ withdrawal east of the Sakarya reached its final stage on 25 July.
- 5–8 August 1921
Authority and resources
The commander-in-chief law on 5 August and National Obligations orders on 7–8 August addressed different needs: command authority and the army’s material requirements.
- 23 August 1921
The next battle: Sakarya
A new defence began on different terrain with reorganised resources. Its later success does not erase July’s losses; it makes understanding the process of recovery essential.
Explore the archive and documentary context
TRT Arşiv
İsmet İnönü — TRT Archive
A supplementary retrospective archive programme on the Western Front commander and the National Struggle. It is not a continuous visual record of the July 1921 fighting; distinguish the later programme’s narrative from the older images it uses.
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Supported YouTube publications can be watched here by choosing to load their player. Videos are not copied onto our server. Interpret archive images alongside their production date and the narrator’s perspective; the official publication link remains as an alternative.
Questions and historical distinctions
Why is Kütahya–Eskişehir not described as a victory?
The Turkish army lost important cities and positions and then withdrew. Preserving formations for another defence mattered, but it does not change the campaign’s result into a victory. An honest chronology distinguishes defeat, recovery and the subsequent success.
Why include 25 July under a heading of 10–24 July?
Sources draw different boundaries around advance, fighting and redeployment. This dossier retains the Ministry’s main battle range while separately identifying the opening movement on 8 July and final withdrawal on 25 July. A conventional heading need not mean that every operational stage ended on the same day.
Was Mustafa Kemal already commander-in-chief in July?
The powers conferred by the law of 5 August 1921 had not yet been granted. In July he provided political and military direction as President of the Assembly, while İsmet Pasha commanded the Western Front. Keeping the legal date intact clarifies Parliament’s role and the commanders’ distinct responsibilities.
Do the picture and film directly document July 1921?
The station photograph was taken on 28 July 2023 and shows a railway location today, not a battle scene. TRT’s programme on İsmet İnönü is a retrospective archive narrative. Contemporary documents, older images and later interpretation are different forms of evidence.
Cumhuriyet Atlas
Continue the story here
6—11 January 1921
First Battle of İnönü
The newly formed regular army’s first major test on the Western Front.
Explore →
23 August—13 September 1921
The Battle of Sakarya
A twenty-two-day-and-night defence halted the advance toward Ankara.
Explore → 23 March—1 April 1921
Second Battle of İnönü
The Western Front was held by the regular army against a broader offensive.
Explore →Documents and sources9 sources
Official reference points used to verify the chronology and interpretive frame on this page.
- The Kütahya–Eskişehir campaign ↗ATAM · harekât
The institutional encyclopaedia entry on the main 10–24 July range, the decision of 18 July and counterattack of 21 July; checked 3 October 2026.
- The War of Independence: Kütahya and Eskişehir phases ↗Türk Tarih Kurumu
The operational account separating the advance of 8 July, counterattack of 21 July and final withdrawal on 25 July; its date boundaries are read alongside the Ministry’s account.
- The National Struggle and air operations ↗MSB · askerî tarih
Western Front command, the 10–24 July range and reconnaissance with limited technical resources.
- The chronology of 1921 ↗Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı
A dated reference for the May command change, July headquarters movement and August decisions; individual entries are checked against other sources.
- Mehmet Nâzım Bey ↗ATAM · komutan biyografisi
Fourth Division command, his death at Yumruçal on 15 July 1921 and posthumous promotion to colonel.
- The Commander-in-Chief Law ↗ATAM · kanun ve yetki
The grant of authority on 5 August 1921 and its initial three-month term, distinguished from Mustafa Kemal’s July role.
- Parliamentary album: the First Assembly and commander-in-chief authority ↗TBMM · yayın ve belge
The place of Law No.144 of 5 August 1921 in parliamentary history; the official record is linked without republishing its image.
- The National Obligations orders ↗ATAM · ikmal
The institutional and social framework of the orders issued on 7–8 August to meet military requirements.
- The Education Congress of 1921 ↗MEB · eğitim tarihi
An educational-history reference showing that programmes remained on the agenda during war; this dossier does not force the disputed exact opening day into its battle chronology.